Economic Transitions in South Africa’s Secondary Cities: Governing Mine Closures by Marais, Lochner et al.
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 381–392
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i2.4032
Article
Economic Transitions in South Africa’s Secondary Cities: Governing
Mine Closures
Lochner Marais 1,3, *, Verna Nel 2, Kholisa Rani 3, Deidré van Rooyen 3, Kentse Sesele 3, Phia van der Watt 3
and Lyndon du Plessis 4
1 Sustainable Minerals Institute, University of Queensland, Australia; E‐Mail: maraisjgl@ufs.ac.za
2 Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of the Free State, South Africa; E‐Mail: nelvj@ufs.ac.za
3 Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State, South Africa; E‐Mails: sigenuk@ufs.ac.za (K.R.),
griesd@ufs.ac.za (D.v.R.), kennywenzi@gmail.com (K.S.), phiavdwatt@gmail.com (P.v.d.W.)
4 Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State, South Africa;
E‐Mail: dplesslm@ufs.ac.za
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 20 January 2021 | Accepted: 19 March 2021 | Published: 25 June 2021
Abstract
Many South African secondary cities depend on a single economic sector, oftenmining or manufacturing. This makes them
vulnerable to economic change and national decision‐making. We describe change in three secondary cities—Emalahleni,
Matjhabeng and Newcastle—all at different phases of economic transition due to imminent mine closure. We investigate
the way local governance and planning are dealing with the change. We draw on concepts from institutional economics
and evolutionary governance theory, material from strategic planning documents, and approximately 50 key informant
interviews. We show how difficult it is to steer economic planning during economic transitions, and we demonstrate how
both economic change and governance are path‐dependent. Path dependency in South Africa’s mining towns has several
causes: the colonial influence, which emphasised extraction and neglected beneficiation; the dominance of a single sector;
the long‐term problems created by mining; and the lack of the skills needed to bring about economic change. The local
governments’ continuing reliance on the New Public Management paradigm, which focuses on steering as opposed to
building networks, compounds the problem, along with poor governance, inadequate local capacity and inappropriate
intergovernmental relations. Of the three towns, only Newcastle has shown signs of taking a new path.
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1. Introduction
Research on secondary cities in the developing world
has focused mostly on their economic role and the spa‐
tial distribution of their population. These cities play
important regional development roles and have strong
links with the global economy. But many of them lack
economic diversity and have global connections in only
one economic sector. Because of the global volatility
in mining and manufacturing on which many of them
depend, their future is not clear. This is true of South
African secondary cities, whose smaller economies (in
comparison with those of the country’s metropolitan
cities) make them vulnerable to changes in technology
and in local and national government decisions (Marais,
2016; Marais et al., 2016). Governing a secondary
city and managing its economic transitions is indeed
a challenge.
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Avis (2016, p. 1) defines urban governance as the
“process by which governments (local, regional and
national) and stakeholders collectively decide how to
plan, finance and manage urban areas.” However, the lit‐
erature on governance outlines a variety of approaches
to governance (Klijn, 2008; Rhodes, 1997) and there
is substantial debate about the meaning of the con‐
cept. We do not have space to elaborate on these but
we emphasise three critical attributes relevant to this
article: Governance has become increasingly complex
and difficult as multiple actors play a role; governance
changes are mostly slow; and because of the complexity
and slowness it is questionable whether governance can
steer transitions.
The challenge for many of South Africa’s secondary
cities is to shift from their dependence on manufactur‐
ing and mining to more diverse economies, to overcome
their vulnerability to national government decisions, and
to adjust to a global economy that requires high‐level
technological skills. These changes will require appro‐
priate governance approaches. Consequently, all South
African municipalities must develop strategic plans
(called integrated development plans [IDPs]). These usu‐
ally include specific sector plans for spatial, housing and
economic development. The idea for these plans was,
as Harrison (2001) explains, to a large extent based on
the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm, which
emphasises ‘steering’ (setting objectives) rather than
‘rowing’ (implementation).
We make two main arguments in this article. We
argue that South Africa’s governance approach is still
primarily rooted in NPM, underplaying the relationship
between actors and overemphasising steering. The NPM
reinforces the existing path dependency and the rigid‐
ity associated with interdependencies and creates gov‐
ernance informalities. This, coupled with inadequate
local capacities and inappropriate intergovernmental
relations, makes local economic transitions difficult.
We argue further that economic transition is particu‐
larly difficult for mining towns attempting to diversify
their economy, because themines create a false sense of
security and interdependency. The article contributes by
linking the literature on economic transitions and gover‐
nance. In many cases, this literature appears in journals
with different theoretical and disciplinary approaches.
2. Evolutionary Governance Theory, Economic
Transitions and Steering
This literature review brings together studies on eco‐
nomic transitions (North, 1990, 2005; Van Assche et
al., 2014, 2016) and on governance (Dunleavy et al.,
2005; Garud & Karnoe, 2001; Klijn, 2008; Kuhlmann et
al., 2008; Stoker, 2006). In discussing the institutional
context (‘the rules of the game’) in this article, we bor‐
row extensively from North (1990, 2005). For North,
institutional change (or rule change) and technologi‐
cal change are the foundation of economic change. He
asserts that change is slow, path‐dependent and usu‐
ally leads to lock‐ins. He describes ‘path dependence’
as the way institutions and beliefs from the past influ‐
ence choices in the present and maintains that con‐
straints on choices in the present result from historical
experiences (North, 2005, p. 21). For new institutional
economists, the history, societal beliefs and institutions
are central to understanding economic change and soci‐
ety’s response. In its simplest form, path dependency
means that institutions constrain the future; more com‐
prehensively it means that “the institutions that have
accumulated give rise to organisations whose survival
depends on the perpetuation of those institutions and
which hence will devote resources to preventing any
alteration” (North, 2005, p. 51). North (1990) says path
dependencies associated with institutions are usually
more complicated than those associated with technol‐
ogy. Path dependency develops because there is a gap
between intentions and outcomes and because it is dif‐
ficult to reverse long‐term directions. North (1990) uses
the term ‘lock‐in’ to describe slow change and the inabil‐
ity to escape history. Lock‐ins occur when change is not
just slow but virtually impossible.
Building on the ideas of North, evolutionary gov‐
ernance theory describes slow change in governance
(Van Assche et al., 2014, 2016). It links economic
change and governance. It draws its ideas from biolog‐
ical evolution and from social theories like new insti‐
tutional economics (from the work of North), complex‐
ity theory and actor‐network theory. Key concepts are
slow change (although it can sometimes be abrupt),
non‐linearity, power relations and governance seen as
evolving. Evolutionary governance theory sees gover‐
nance as a central aspect of politics and distinguishes
three types of dependency: path dependency, goal
dependency, and interdependency.
In this article we are interested in two of these
dependencies: interdependencies and path dependen‐
cies. Interdependencies can originate from path depen‐
dency and can be constructive or damaging. Current
organisations and their rules and associations origi‐
nate from historical interactions and expectations (Greif,
2006). On the negative side these relationships can
lead to rigidity, conflict and power plays, preventing
change, but on the positive side to collaboration, partner‐
ships, expertise and resources (Van Assche et al., 2016).
Generally, interdependencies depend on cooperation,
responsibility and trust. They can also contribute to gov‐
ernance networking or what Klijn et al. (1995) refer to as
‘policy networking’ or ‘network steering.’ Network steer‐
ing assumes an understanding of actors and their rela‐
tionships, resources, institutions and perceptions. Klijn
et al. (1995, p. 439) say the main consequence of pol‐
icy networking or network steering is that “when a (gov‐
ernmental) actor tries to govern policy processes, he has
to take the characteristics of this network into account.”
In addition to obliging actors to understand the net‐
work, network steering is also dependent on resource
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distribution, the rules of resource distribution within the
network and perceptions within the network.
Understanding the sources of path dependency is
crucial for planners. They need to take cognisance of
the historical nature of governance systems and their
interlocking chains of causation. Many governance sys‐
tems reproduce themselves in complex ways, along a
multiplicity of paths that all have different possible out‐
comes. Earlier studies of path dependency were mainly
at the national level or on specific issues like technology
change (North, 1990). Increasingly there is a tendency to
study it at the local level, and evolutionary governance
theory has integrated the concepts of economic change
and politics.
The question now is what role strategic planning and
governance play in path dependencies and interdepen‐
dencies. Garud and Karnoe (2001) emphasise that it is
possible to create new paths (through strategic planning)
despite path dependence. Klijn (2008) identifies four
ways in which governance can contribute to strategic
planning: good governance and administration, the NPM
paradigm, intergovernmental relations, and networks.
In this article we are primarily interested in contrasting
governance that relies on the NPM paradigm with gover‐
nance that relies on networks. However, the other two
approaches (good governance and administration, and
intergovernmental relations) remain a central part of
our framework for understanding the governance of eco‐
nomic transitions. Intergovernmental relations and the
varying levels of interdependence are crucial for under‐
standing governance in South Africa. Good governance
remains a challenge here.
The rise of NPM in the 1980s was a prime example
of prioritising steering in the public sector. NPM empha‐
sised setting goals, developing outcomes‐based pro‐
grammes, distinguishing between politics and adminis‐
tration, making government more business‐like, institut‐
ing performance‐based payments and delinking policy
and implementation (creating implementation vehicles;
Stoker, 2006). The German government called their
model of NPM the ‘New Steering Model’ (Neues
Steuerungsmodell; Kuhlmann et al., 2008). Many govern‐
ments have used this approach to ‘modernise’ their pub‐
lic service and to move away from the Weberian bureau‐
cratic model of public administration (Stoker, 2006,
p. 45). Evaluations point to a range of achievements,
such as savings and efficiency gains, customer orienta‐
tion and service quality (Kuhlmann et al., 2008). But con‐
cerns remain, among them the inability to achieve an
appropriate separation between politics and administra‐
tion, resistance to implementation, inadequate cost sav‐
ings in staff and time, failure to contribute to better
decision‐making despite the rhetoric, continued conflict
between centralised and decentralised management, lit‐
tle reduction in political interference, and only partial
efficiency gains (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Kuhlmann et al.,
2008). In their evaluation of the New Steering Model,
Kuhlmann et al. (2008, p. 859) conclude that “with its
schematic dualism of politics and administration, [it] is
conceptually misleading and stands in stark contrast to
the reality of political decisionmaking,” and Stoker (2006,
p. 46) argues that it requires politicians “to be separated
from their party and other political colleagues and con‐
nections to exercise good judgment.” The NPMparadigm
has also been criticised for limited theoretical grounding,
not taking historical evidence into account, and using evi‐
dence selectively (Hood & Peters, 2004).
In contrast, other understandings of governance
stress the relationships between institutions like net‐
works (Klijn, 2008; Klijn et al., 1995). Stoker (2006, p. 41)
argues that the state should “steer society in new ways
through the development of complex networks” and
use “more bottom‐up approaches to decision making.”
He says the trend towards using networks in governance
means that a wider range of participants will be seen
as “legitimate members of the decision‐making process
in the context of considerable uncertainty and complex‐
ity.” This kind of governance differs from NPM in not pre‐
setting targets but negotiating themwith the actors, and
in emphasising rights and responsibilities rather than tar‐
gets. However, policy networking or network steering is
not an appropriate response per se. Klijn et al. (1995) say
themargins are notwide; only limited resources are avail‐
able and self‐interests prevail. There is no guarantee that
network steering provides better outcomes than other
processes, but this indirect steering could have some
benefits in contrast to direct policy approaches.
Above, we discussed how governance interacts with
or steers economic transitions by focusing on formal gov‐
ernance and transition processes. However, governance
also interacts with political transition and vice versa and
can be formal or informal. Informality is now a core com‐
ponent of urban governance worldwide (Sarmiento &
Tilly, 2018; Van Assche et al., 2013). In a book review,
Bejacovic (2016, p. 464) writes that “unofficial produc‐
tion, nonregistration of economic activities and/or cor‐
ruption may be deemed the solution rather than the
problem because such practices might be seen as the
only way in which the state can be made to work.”
Informality can play a range of roles, such as replacing
the state by providing services the state should deliver,
blurring the lines between the state and the community,
getting involved in confrontations with the law (not fol‐
lowing procedure), and engaging in institutionalised cor‐
ruption (Polese, 2016). Furthermore, notions of formal‐
ity and informality change frequently, making such a dis‐
tinction difficult and influence other institutions in com‐
plex interactions (Van Assche et al., 2013)
3. The Case Studies
Our discussion in this article is based on case stud‐
ies of three secondary cities—Emalahleni, Matjhabeng
and Newcastle—chosen to represent three stages of
economic transition. Emalahleni, in the Mpumalanga
Province, a coal‐mining town and the heart of South
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Africa’s coal‐generated electricity system, is facing prob‐
able major economic transition in the next decade
because of the global and local need for cleaner energy.
Matjhabeng, a gold mining town in the Free State
Province, has seen three decades of decline in gold pro‐
duction and been unable to find an alternative eco‐
nomic base. Newcastle, a coal‐mining town in north‐
ern Kwazulu‐Natal, has managed an economic transition
away from coal and steel and towardsmanufacturing but
has lately struggled to keep up the momentum. The case
studies were conducted between 2017 and 2019, using
data from Statistics South Africa and Global Insight, plan‐
ning documents, and 52 interviews with key informants:
political role players, mining company staff, municipal
officials responsible for planning, and representatives
from NGOs. The informants were selected via snowball
sampling.We used thematic analysis to analyse the inter‐
view transcripts.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of seats that the
African National Congress (ANC), which has the major‐
ity in South Africa’s parliament, obtained in local govern‐
ment elections in these three towns.
In Emalahleni and Matjhabeng, the ANC’s support
has declined since 2006, with the ANC holding 60% of
the seats in Emalahleni and nearly 65% in Matjhabeng.
In Newcastle, the ANC has increased its share of seats
since 2000 and now has 61% of the seats. The decline
in the first two was the result of a national trend, while
the rise in Newcastle was primarily due to the Inkatha
Freedom Party’s disintegration. Historically the ANC in
Newcastle had to form coalitions with other parties or
collaborate with them, because its majority was slim;
since 2016 it has not had to do this.
4. The Three Cities
Secondary cities in South Africa, referred to as ‘interme‐
diate cities,’ have no specific legal status as such. South
African legislation recognises Category A municipalities
(eight metropolitan areas), Category B municipalities
(226 local municipalities) and Category C municipalities
(44 district municipalities). A district municipality usu‐
ally consists of three to six local municipalities. Recent
policy development has established the Intermediate
City Municipality Support Programme (2018). The pro‐
gramme subdivides the 39 secondary cities into five
categories: large/semi‐diverse (4), manufacturing (9),
mining (10), service centres (10), and low GVA and
high‐density areas (6; South African Cities Network,
2020) and requires these cities to provide appropriate
strategic plans and sound financial management.
The local strategic plans (IDPs) for municipalities in
South Africa include, among other things, sectoral plans
for housing, spatial development and local economic
development (LED). The IDPs are usually very good at
setting targets and providing plans for steering, in line
with NPM ideas. This approach to strategic planning, cou‐
pled with political power play and local governments’
severe capacity constraints, lies at the heart of the prob‐
lemwhen it comes to economic transition. Deteriorating
municipal finances, inadequate municipal financial man‐
agement (Auditor General of South Africa, 2020) and the
large number of local protests point to serious gover‐
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Figure 1. Local government election results in Emalahleni, Matjhabeng and Newsactle, 2000, 2006, 2011 and 2016. Source:
Electoral Commission of South Africa (n.d.).
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4.1. Emalahleni
Witbank, later renamed Emalahleni (‘place of coal’), was
declared a town in 1903. A rail link with the goldfields on
the Witwatersrand opened shortly after that, enabling
the mines to provide coal at scale and for low prices.
By the early 1930s the first coal‐fired power station was
operating. In the 1960s Anglo American created Africa’s
first private steel mill in Witbank. Today about 70% of
South Africa’s coal is used locally in coal‐fired power sta‐
tions and the rest is exported via Richards Bay. The local
economy depends on coal and the coal‐fired power sta‐
tions that provide approximately 40% of South Africa’s
energy. But the pollution associated with mining and the
power stations has made Emalahleni one of the coun‐
try’s pollution hotspots. Economic growth between 1996
and 2018 averaged 1.4% per annum and the area bene‐
fited from the commodity boom of the 2000s. The pop‐
ulation grew by 3.3% per annum and totalled 460,000
people in 2016. Despite these high levels of economic
growth, the local government is struggling to provide ser‐
vices and cannot pay its electricity bill with Eskom, the
national electricity utility (Campbell et al., 2016, 2017).
Emalahleni Local Municipality has not received unquali‐
fied audits for the past five financial years. The current
state of municipal finance makes it unlikely there will
be any contribution from the municipality to help man‐
agemine closure (Hendriks, 2022). The provincial govern‐
ment had to appoint an administrator on two occasions
to manage the municipality on behalf of the Council.
A previous administrator noted that municipal council‐
lors and officials had stolen from the municipality and
driven it into bankruptcy (Campbell et al., 2016, 2017).
The municipality also struggles to provide adequate
services and housing. The result is the construction
of large numbers of informal dwellings to counter the
municipality’s inability to deal with the housing problem.
Noneof the seven key performance areas in the IDP takes
into account mine decline and closure as a future threat.
The IDP uses the word ‘closure’ only once (Emalahleni
Local Municipality, 2021). In their social and labour plans
the mines responded by setting up a closure reference
group. Beyond this structure, no real plans are available.
Interviewees seldom raised the issue of possible mine
closure and its implications, as the main concern was
dealing with the effects of mining growth. Instead, we
heard comments like “the municipality is not coping,”
“there are problems with growing informal settlements
because of mine employees,” and “the mines should fix
the potholes.” They also referred to the large influx of
people. Because of these problems, one of the mining
companies is now selling water to the municipality.
With the worldwide shift to renewables and cleaner
forms of energy, the local and international demand for
coal is likely to decline. The dollar price of coal was
at a global high at the end of 2019 but has declined
steadily since then (the deteriorating value of the rand
to the dollar has buffered this slightly). Like most other
nations, South Africa has signed the Paris Agreement.
Consequently, the Department of Energy is actively pro‐
moting renewable energy and Eskom is likely to scale
down its old coal plants. These decisions will have dev‐
astating effects on the economy of Emalahleni, but
there has been no concerted effort at the local level to
manage the risks. The municipality largely ignores the
potential consequences of mine and power station clo‐
sure. A national effort to plan a just transition (ensuring
that renewable energy does not create unemployment
among mineworkers) is underway, but it is not clear to
what degree these plans consider the complexities of the
local governance (Marais et al., 2022).
4.2. Matjhabeng
The South African Government and Anglo American
established the town of Welkom in 1947, when mining
companies started to sink shafts in the area. This initiated
the Free State Goldfields, which became Matjhabeng
under the post‐apartheid dispensation (after 1994). At its
height in the mid‐1980s the area produced more than
25% of the gold in the free world and employed 180,000
mineworkers (Marais, 2013a, 2013b). However, mine
decline and closure became a reality from the early
1990s, because of the depletion of the gold reserves,
the cost of deep mining, a rise in wages and stricter
health and safety requirements. Although mining and
mine employment is still dominant in the area, there are
only about 25,000 mineworkers left (Denoon‐Stevens,
2019). Between 1996 and 2018 the economy declined by
3%per annum, but goldminingwas still contributing 45%
of GVA in 2018 (down from 62% in 1996). The size of the
economy in 2018 was only 55% of what it had been in
1996. Economic decline has had detrimental social con‐
sequences in the area (Sesele et al., 2021) and has also
resulted in a drop in the population from480,000 in 1996
to 430,000 in 2016.
Over the years, various governance approaches have
tried to revamp the economy of the area (Marais, 2013b).
In the 1960s, the provincial government established a
commission to prevent the development of a ghost town
once mining ended (Marais & Nel, 2016). In the late
1980s, several of the towns in the Goldfields area estab‐
lished a separate development unit—in line with the
NPMapproach—which emphasises that implementation
should take place outside the ambit of local govern‐
ment (Marais, 2013b). The new political rulers in the
post‐apartheid dispensation dismantled this institution
in the mid‐1990s, but a similar attempt followed in the
early 2000s. These attempts have been hampered by
political infighting and unrealistic plans. Many mayors
did not complete their terms and the turnover of munic‐
ipal managers has been extraordinarily high (Sesele,
2020). Like Emalahleni, Matjhabeng Local Municipality
has not received unqualified audits for the past five finan‐
cial years. Today, a regional development agency is oper‐
ating at the district level, but it is not clear how successful
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it is. The economic development function is within the
ambit of the Matjhabeng Council.
In 2019, with the financial aid of the mines,
Matjhabeng contracted a private service provider to cre‐
ate a LED plan to form part of the IDP. However, the
plan assumes a large percentage of funding from other
spheres of government as Matjhabeng’s financial situa‐
tion is dire. Most respondents were extremely proud of
this plan that had been produced to deal with the eco‐
nomic situation. In most interviews, it was the first topic
raised by interviewees. One interviewee, referring to
this dependence on other spheres of government, asked,
“When will the provincial and national government take
us seriously?” Another said: “We have a plan now; the
national government should now come to the party”—
emphasising the importance of having a plan or steering
and the need for national government support based on
the plan. The interviewees seemed to believe that hav‐
ing a plan automatically means that action will result.
Implementation will be hindered not only by lack of gov‐
ernment support but also by lack of institutional capac‐
ity. Furthermore, the plan does not refer to the regional
service role developed around Welkom (the municipal‐
ity’s main urban area), which is central to strategic plans
for intermediate city municipalities (Marais et al., 2016).
The need to find an alternative ‘big’ plan for mining
makes the planners overlook the role of regional services.
The LED directorate’s capacity in the municipality is lim‐
ited, with not enough staff members and without a sin‐
gle economist. A functional directorate should create net‐
works within the government and between the govern‐
ment and the private sector. Although relationships with
the business community have improved lately, there is
scant evidence of joint projects and programmes outside
managing an increase in crime.
Despite the ANC’s majority in the Council,
Matjhabeng has been politically unstable, as is evident
from the fact that none of the mayors in the last three
terms (2001–2006, 2006–2011 and 2011–2016) com‐
pleted their terms. The municipality has had more than
ten municipal managers over the last 20 years, suggest‐
ing a constant conflict between the political office bear‐
ers and the technocrats.
4.3. Newcastle
The discovery of coal near Newcastle in 1865 laid the
foundation for the establishment of the town. By the
1960s coal mining was the main reason why Iscor (a pre‐
vious state corporation manufacturing steel in South
Africa) created a new steel mill in 1968. Iscor was
also prominent as an estate developer and constructed
hundreds of houses for its employees in Newcastle.
By the mid‐1980s Newcastle’s manufacturing sector
(mainly steel) was contributing about 50% of the Gross
Geographic Product. By the end of the 1980s the govern‐
ment had privatised Iscor, which meant that many peo‐
ple working in the steel and coal industries lost their jobs.
In response, the local government and business obtained
subsidies that the apartheid government made available
for decentralised industries and settled several Chinese
industries in the textile industry in the area in the
early 1990s (Todes, 2002). By 1994 there were approxi‐
mately 140 Chinese companies (mainly textile and plas‐
tic manufacturing) operating in Newcastle. However, as
the post‐apartheid government systematically reduced
the industry subsidies and textile‐related import taxes
from 1994, the textile industry also came under pres‐
sure. Nonetheless, the municipality managed to retain
many of the textile industries, developed an excellent
relationship with the existing industrialists andmarketed
the area well in China. Newcastle also slowly built capac‐
ity in other manufacturing subsectors and actively pur‐
sued other economic sectors (Binns & Nel, 2003).
The Newcastle municipal area is home to 390,000
people. Annual economic growth was only 0.2% per
annum between 1996 and 2018. Despite this slow
growth, Newcastle has avoided decline and, to some
degree, managed a transition from mining to textiles
to the manufacturing of niche materials (chemicals and
paper). Interviewees in our study were quick to point
out that coalition governments and good governance
were central features of managing these transitions
between 1994 and 2016. A common response during
interviews was “local government and business had
excellent relationships.” The good relationship with the
chamber of commerce and industrialists in China (evi‐
denced, for example, by a long‐standing LED official
learningMandarin) contributed to this success. However,
the value of these governance and network gains has
come under pressure as the local government has strug‐
gled to maintain good governance since 2016. After the
2016 local government elections, the ANC had a major‐
ity and no further need for a coalition. The new majority
government did not complywith good governance princi‐
ples and did not value the earlier economic partnerships.
High staff turnover, the retirement of the LED official
mentioned above, political infighting in the ruling party,
weak leadership (because of failure to appoint a per‐
manent municipal manager and chief financial officer)
since 2016 have further complicated matters. Ensuring
Newcastle’s economic viability has become farmore chal‐
lenging than it was five years ago. The editor of the local
newspaper said that, because of the “lack of strategic
ways to deal with problems, people of Newcastle started
working in silos”). This silo mentality stands in contrast
to the early attempts to create networks inside and out‐
side the municipality to deal with the economic transi‐
tion. An official at the municipality explained the prob‐
lem since 2016 as “a lack of engagement between the
municipality and business elite” and “a lack of network
governance because there are no relationships across
sectors, no political leadership.” The failure to build
appropriate networks also contributed to industrialists
considering alternative locations. The former economic
development manager at the Newcastle municipality
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said: “The factories are also all moving to Lesotho and
Swaziland because they comply with the African Growth
and Opportunities Act to export to the US.” To deal with
the financial shortfalls created by the ANC‐led local gov‐
ernment, council raised property taxes by nearly 100%.
This has been greeted with outrage by firms and individ‐
ual households. This decision will probably force many
industrialists to consider relocation. The hike in tariffs
and limited engagement with economic development
issues have created a unified opposition from business
chambers, rate payers and concerned residents.
Local politics have been unstable, and some promi‐
nent ANC leaders and councillors in KwaZulu‐Natal have
been assassinated. This rivalry in the province has also
played itself out in Newcastle. In May 2019 a witness in
the trial of the Newcastle mayor, who had been charged
with the murder of an ANC youth league leader in 2016,
was gunned down—the charges against the mayor have
since been dropped (Mavuso, 2019). The political rivalry
and murders have not helped the local government
prioritise economic development and manage the eco‐
nomic transition.
5. Discussion
Table 1 compares the profiles of the three case study
cities and the different ways they have dealt with mine
decline. Newcastle has mostly been successful in finding




Witbank (1903) Welkom (1947) Newcastle (1865)
Population 1996 455,228 476,763 287,659
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Declining demand for coal and
transition to renewables.
Depletion of gold reserves,
cost of deep mining.
Initially, decline in demand for
coal, privatisation of ISCOR.
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reserves are inexhaustible.
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Planning system focusing on
steering and not rowing.
National government support
promised, but nothing has
materialised.
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transition dependent on
national government funding
and the buy‐in of the private
sector.
A local plan for revitalising the
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intergovernmental funding but
it has not materialised.
First transition heavily
dependent on using a national
instrument to help switch





Local plans do not consider
mine closure and a
post‐closure economy.
Much emphasis on finding a
single alternative to mining.
Value of regional services
function lost.
Local plans have always
included, or been driven by,
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local planning. Some evidence
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alternatives to coal mining and the related steel manu‐
facturing industry. In contrast, Matjhabeng, despite set‐
ting up various bodies outside the ambit of government,
has failed to develop an industrial alternative to mining.
In Emalahleni there is scant local recognition of the loom‐
ing mine closure, though there have been some national
responses aimed at ensuring a just transition in this city.
Several factors affect the potential economic transi‐
tions in these three case study cities. Firstly, the colonial
economic emphasis on resource extraction, as opposed
to local beneficiation (creating high value goods), per‐
sists in the three cities, although some beneficiation
did occur in Emalahleni and Newcastle. For example,
coal production in Emalahleni is directly associated
with power generation and a steel industry did initially
develop but failed in 2015. South Africa has seen very
little beneficiation of gold. Some attempts were made
in Matjhabeng, such as creating a jewellery hub, but
the outcomes have been dismal. Neither Emalahleni nor
Newcastle has been able to sustain initial attempts to
create a viable steel industry (although the steel mill in
Newcastle, now owned by ArcelorMittal, still functions).
Secondly, these cities have long been dependent on a
single industry. The adverse effects that mining can have
on a country, referred to as the ‘resource curse’ or the
‘DutchDisease,’ arewell known. At a local level, the effect
can be to make local decision‐makers overconfident and
unable to anticipate decline (Marais & De Lange, 2021).
Matjhabeng is a prime example. The first retrenchments
in 1991 came as a surprise to many, although the decline
in the gold reserves and an ‘overheated’ global market
were evident. The worst scenario Matjhabeng imagined
at the end 1989 was not nearly as bad as the reality
on the ground 10 years later (Marais, 2013b). The long
dependence on gold has blinded the municipality to the
possibility of decline and the need to choose a new path.
Many of Matjhabeng’s plans focus on finding a single
large industry to replace mining. The latest plan does
not consider the value of the regional service function
of Welkom. The plans assume a magical replacement for
mining instead of thinking about the economic diversifi‐
cation that has already occurred or focusing on a range
of small initiatives. The inability to imagine potential
change is also evident in Emalahleni. Despite national
attempts to achieve a just transition in this city, little
effort to deal with the risk of decline can be seen at
local level. The Emalahleni IDP underplays the risk of coal
demand falling. The historical focus on a single sector in
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both Emalahleni and Matjhabeng seems entrenched in
future planning, blinding the governance structures to
more viable alternatives. Newcastle, on the other hand,
shows evidence that it is indeed possible to break the
path dependency.
Thirdly, all three cities need to develop plans that
consider the long‐term implications of mining (Erikson,
1994). The environmental and health risks of living
between themine dumps remain a reality. A prime exam‐
ple is the Merriespruit disaster of 1994: A slimes dam
from a non‐operational mine burst during a flash flood
and killed 17 people in the Merriespruit suburb in the
town of Virginia in Matjhabeng. Although the closure of
themines and the coal‐fired power stationsmight reduce
air pollution, the effects of acid mine water and under‐
ground fires will be a reality in Emalahleni for a long time.
People in all three of these cities will have to live with the
adverse effects of mining on economic and spatial poten‐
tial for a long time.
Fourthly, all three cities’ economic transitions
depend on old skills. In Newcastle, the transition from
coal and steel to textiles helped to ensure that low‐skilled
workers did find work. In Matjhabeng this was more
difficult. Mineworkers’ skills are not conducive either
to finding work in other sectors or to creating new
entrepreneurs. Economic transitions require new skills
sets and the secondary status of our three case study
cities means that although they have some satellite cam‐
puses of universities in themetro cities, they do not have
mainstream universities to fall back on, to build the skills
needed for economic transition. At the same time, many
of their Further Education and Training colleges are dys‐
functional and do not align well with the local demand
for skills.
In addition to the problems associated with eco‐
nomic transition, there are also governance problems.
The NPM‐based focus on steering results in IDPs that
havemany goals but lack an understanding of the current
economy and how difficult it is to change it. The focus
on steeringmeans that the plans are over‐idealistic, mak‐
ing implementation extremely difficult. Matjhabeng has
made various unrealistic plans, such as the idea of build‐
ing an international freight airport or, more problemati‐
cally, the Phakisa racetrack, which was constructed but
has become dysfunctional. The steering approach also
leads to ignoring an existing problem, as Emalahleni does.
Neither Emalahleni norMatjhabeng have functional part‐
nerships with the business community. Newcastle’s suc‐
cess in breaking path dependency contrasts with the
NPM steering approach, as can be seen in the actions
of the LED official who created partnerships with the
local business chamber and even learned Mandarin to
create partnerships with Chinese businesspeople. A fur‐
ther problem caused by the focus on planning and steer‐
ing is that it blinds decision‐makers to the economic tran‐
sitions that occur spontaneously without much planning.
All three cities have developed regional services func‐
tions as part of a natural process. Yet existing plans often
ignore the value of this and do not consider using it as an
economic asset for the future.
The problem becomes bigger with capacity con‐
straints. It is this lack of capacity, in conjunction with a
steering‐focused planning approach, that underlies the
inability at local level to find appropriate economic alter‐
natives, as has happened in Emalahleni and Matjhabeng.
Those two towns have had very long periods of poor
governance, reflected in the lack of unqualified audited
financial statements, being run by an administrator, high
levels of corruption, and high staff turnover and politi‐
cal appointments.
Economic transitions require an understanding of
interdependencies and network steering. However, the
rigidity of intergovernmental relationships and the inabil‐
ity to manage networks are evident from the three case
studies. Newcastle benefited from the apartheid govern‐
ment’s decentralisation subsidies in the early 1990s, but
there is currently no national support for economic tran‐
sitions in Emalahleni and Matjhabeng. There is an expec‐
tation that the current national focus on a just transition
will provide a framework to help Emalahleni. Again, the
focus is on a plan that emphasises steering rather than
building the networks that would facilitate a transition.
In Matjhabeng, the dominant thinking is that a new plan
(an example of steering) will revitalise the economy. This
plan is heavily dependent on the national government
andprivate‐sector investment, neither ofwhich has been
actively sought by decision‐makers in the area. In both
Emalahleni and Matjhabeng, there is a lack of network
steering and the focus remains on a plan. Furthermore,
the secondary cities tend to simplify co‐operative gov‐
ernance to a process of acquiring funding from other
spheres of government. Matjhabeng’s LED plan depends
mainly on this assumption. And the transition plan that
the national government is developing for Emalahleni is a
danger because it might be inappropriate to the local sit‐
uation. To some degree, Newcastle has managed to find
appropriate intergovernmental funding for its first tran‐
sition frommining to textiles. Managing the second tran‐
sition away from textiles, as the lifting of import taxes
will make the industry in Newcastle vulnerable, might be
more difficult. A focus on planning can make planners
overlook the need to work with nearby municipalities.
Furthermore, the planning approach described above
depends on national targets. In practice, municipalities
and provincial governments must align their plans with
theNational Development Plan. This requirementmeans
that much emphasis is on the planning process (steering)
rather than finding practical local ways of managing an
economic transition.
Poor governance and an increase in informality are
evident. Newcastle had a stint of good governance
up to 2016, but good governance needs to be main‐
tained. Newcastle showed how a municipality could
use its municipal finance to help economic transi‐
tions by finding a balance between basic infrastructure
and infrastructure for business development. Coalition
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governments enabled political parties to contribute to
economic development in Newcastle. However, in 2016
one party received a council majority and did not see the
value of engaging the other parties in decision‐making.
Governance problems also include being managed by an
administrator (in Emalahleni), a high turnover of munic‐
ipal managers (in Matjhabeng) and mayors not complet‐
ing their terms (in Matjhabeng). Evidence of governance
informality can be seen in the growth of informal set‐
tlements in Emalahleni as a result of the municipality’s
inability to deal with the large influx of job seekers, and
the alleged cases of corruption in all three cities.
6. Conclusion
The future of many secondary cities depends on their
ability to manage economic transition. Governing a city
in the course of economic transition is difficult. This arti‐
cle looked at evidence from three secondary cities in
South Africa that have been, or are, mine dependent.
The three case studies illustrate path dependency, inter‐
dependencies and governance informality.
The economic path dependencies include the histor‐
ical colonial structure of the economy that emphasised
extraction rather than beneficiation, the long depen‐
dence on a single economic sector, and the low‐level
technology associated with mining that does not fos‐
ter local technological change. The effects of living with
the environmental damage caused bymining are beyond
the scope of this article to discuss, other than to note
that they obviously compound the three cities’ prob‐
lems. The path dependency in governance and manage‐
ment (associated with the NPM paradigm) is inappropri‐
ate for managing economic transitions. The emphasis on
‘steering’ (as opposed to ‘rowing’), coupled with severe
capacity constraints and a lack of good governance,
has had unintended consequences. This result has been
large‐scale unrealistic projects in the case ofMatjhabeng
and simply ignoring potential economic transition in the
case of Emalahleni. The Newcastle municipality, driven
by a LED official, offered some encouraging evidence of a
network approach to governing the city’s economic tran‐
sition, building relationships with the chamber of com‐
merce and with investors. This city managed to go some
way towards a successful economic transition but now
looks like losing the initial gains.
Interdependencies developed in these three cities
because of the focus on steering in the local govern‐
ment planning system. Some of these interdependen‐
cies result from rigid intergovernmental relations, but
also from the IDP system, which emphasises steer‐
ing and not networking and naively assumes that the
national government and private sector will automati‐
cally offer support.
Governance informality is increasing, with people or
organisations replacing the state or taking matters into
their own hands. This is evident in the growth of infor‐
mal settlements, private companies having to do the
work of the municipality, for example by providing water,
and allegations of corruption. Governance rules have
become irrelevant for some.
Rigidity, interdependencies and governance infor‐
mality are making economic transition difficult for these
three cities. We believe that the underlying problem is a
planning system that focuses primarily on steering and
reinforces these hindrances to good governance. On top
of this, the false sense of security created by the mines
discourages economic diversification, making economic
transition particularly difficult for mining towns such
as these.
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